Gradualism and Irreversibility

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00208zbMath1035.91013OpenAlexW3121893222MaRDI QIDQ4789808

Ben Lockwood, Jonathan P. Thomas

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00208

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gametwo-player gamepartial cooperationmultistage gamesymmetric equilibriumasymmetric equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Discrete-time games (91A50) Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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