Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00641.xzbMath1152.91459OpenAlexW2118622061MaRDI QIDQ5393921

Massimo Morelli, John H. Kagel, Guillaume R. Fréchette

Publication date: 24 October 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00641.x

zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingdemand bargainingalternating offerbehavioral identification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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