A bargaining model of endogenous procedures

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-1002-ZzbMath1392.91095OpenAlexW3121460446WikidataQ110167416 ScholiaQ110167416MaRDI QIDQ2361514

Carlo Prato, Razvan Vlaicu, Daniel Diermeier

Publication date: 30 June 2017

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1002-z

zbMATH Keywords

endogenous procedure of policymakingmultilateral bargaining model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power ⋮ Inequality, participation, and polarization ⋮ BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH ⋮ Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining

Cites Work

• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
• Order restricted preferences and majority rule
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
• Recognition for sale
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
• Executive Control and Legislative Success

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