A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem

DOI10.2307/1911725MaRDI QIDQ3743038zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacques Crémer, Michael H. Riordan

Publication date 1985

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1911725

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect information about preferencesimplementing an optimal provision of public goodssequential solutionStackelberg truthful (SST) mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Recommendations

• Dynamic provision of public goods
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Cited in

(21)

• A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
• Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
• Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information
• Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics
• Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
• Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision
• Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
• Dynamic provision of public goods
• On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
• The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods -- the general case
• Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game
• Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency
• On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
• Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
• Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints
• Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems
• A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods
• On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
• AGV mechanism balances the budget with minimum total transfer variance
• Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games

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