A generalization of the backward induction method in aligned games

DOI10.3934/JDG.2024031MaRDI QIDQ7009941zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Subir K. Chakrabarti, Iryna Topolyan

Publication date 19 March 2025

Published in Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3934/JDG.2024031

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionbeliefsconsistent assessmentpartial orderperfect Bayesian equilibriumsequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Equilibrium refinements (91A11) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites work

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• On the backward induction method
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Recall in extensive form games
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Sequential Equilibria
• The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality
• Trees and decisions

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