A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions
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Cites work
- A characterization of the position value
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Cited in
(6)- Cooperative interconnection settlement among ISPs through NAP
- Towards a solution concept for network formation games
- Probabilistic network values
- Marginality and Myerson values
- Multilateral bargaining in networks: on the prevalence of inefficiencies
- A new value for cooperative games based on coalition size
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