Adaptation and complexity in repeated games
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3249395 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3341950 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
- Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games
- Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- In defense of DEFECT.
- Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
- Limited foresight may force cooperation
- Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
- Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
- Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts.
- Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
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