An efficient solution to the informed principal problem

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.09.010MaRDI QIDQ938057zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sergei Severinov

Publication date 18 August 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian mechanismsinformed principalmechanism designperfect sequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibria
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values

Cited in

(12)

• Bribing in second-price auctions
• Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
• Mechanism design by an informed principal: private values with transferable utility
• On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
• Collective decision through an informed mediator
• Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information
• Verifiable disclosure
• An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
• Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability

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