Characterizations of perfect recall
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- Borel structures for function spaces
- Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result
- Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection?
- Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games
- Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3277161 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Large extensive form games
- On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
- Recall in extensive form games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Trees and decisions
- Trees and extensive forms
- Ways of randomizing and the problem of their equivalence
Cited in
(10)- Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
- Recall in extensive form games
- Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
- Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall
- Backward induction in games without perfect recall
- Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices
- A characterization of von Neumann games in terms of memory
- Information flows and memory in games
- Specifying a game-theoretic extensive form as an abstract 5-ary relation
- Minimum memory for equivalence between \textit{ex ante} optimality and time-consistency
This page was built for publication: Characterizations of perfect recall
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2398185)