Consulting collusive experts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.04.011MaRDI QIDQ2195705zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dilip Mookherjee, Alberto Motta, Masatoshi Tsumagari

Publication date 27 August 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.011

zbMATH Keywords

collusionmechanism designexpertdelegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
• Monitoring experts
• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
• Principal and expert agent

Cites work

• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
• Decentralization and collusion
• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
• Mechanism design with collusive supervision
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal collusion-proof auctions
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• The organization of supplier networks: effects of delegation and intermediation.
• Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions

Cited in

(6)

• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion
• When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
• The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences

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