Equitable Voting Rules

DOI10.3982/ECTA17032MaRDI QIDQ5860016zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Laurent Bartholdi, Wade Hann-Caruthers, Maya Josyula, Omer Tamuz, Leeat Yariv

Publication date 18 November 2021

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.01227

zbMATH Keywords

equitygroup theoryMay's theoremsymmetry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Abstract: May's Theorem (1952), a celebrated result in social choice, provides the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a weakening of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally. We show that such rules can have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population, but not less than the square root of the population size. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from group theory and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.

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Cited in

(16)

• Equitable agendas: Agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions
• Group support and top-heavy rules
• Communication compatible voting rules
• Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
• Symmetry groups
• Variable-population voting rules
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2000142 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910816 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
• Symmetric reduced-form voting
• Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules
• Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
• A single relation theory of welfarist social evaluation
• Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff
• Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems
• May's theorem in an infinite setting

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