Fair imposition
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
Cited in
(17)- Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds
- Destroy to save
- Fair Groves mechanisms
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
- Expressive markets for donating to charities
- Egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms in the allocation of heterogeneous objects
- Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
- Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
This page was built for publication: Fair imposition
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1886294)