Mechanism design in fair sequencing

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-39344-0_14MaRDI QIDQ6535814zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Zhou Chen, Yiming Ding, Qi Qi, Ling-Fei Yu

Publication date 28 February 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39344-0_14

zbMATH Keywords

budget-balanceDSICegalitariansequence positions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A crash course in implementation theory
• A simple budget-balanced mechanism
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Egalitarianism under earmark constraints
• Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
• Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
• Incentives in Teams

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