On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 992411 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
- Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
- Geometry of voting
- Inverted orders for monotone scoring rules
- Millions of election outcomes from a single profile
- On probability models in voting theory
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
- On the volume of hyperbolic polyhedra
- Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
- Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
- Social choice and individual values
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
- The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
- The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
Cited in
(19)- Complexity and the geometry of voting
- Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions
- Probability calculations for transitivity of the simple majority rule
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
- Frequency based analysis of collective aggregation rules
- Investigating the probability of a voting cycle when the electorate is large
- The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences
- On the Probability of the Ostrogorski Paradox
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: the relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidates
- Consequences of reversing preferences
- Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules
- Axiomatization of a preference for most probable winner
- Generalized Condorcet winners
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7675552 (Why is no real title available?)
- The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner
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