Proportionality-based fairness and strategyproofness in the facility location problem
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Cites work
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- Information disclosure with many alternatives
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- The bargaining problem
- The capacity constrained facility location problem
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- Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
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