Electoral competition with strategic voters
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Publication:1786743
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.09.002zbMATH Open1396.91134OpenAlexW2752062472MaRDI QIDQ1786743FDOQ1786743
Authors: Claudia Meroni 
Publication date: 25 September 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://dse.univr.it/home/workingpapers/wp2017n7.pdf
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Cites Work
Cited In (11)
- Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
- On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Poisson voting games under proportional rule
- Vote-motivated candidates
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case
- Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
- How two-party competition treats minorities
- Strategic voting in repeated referenda
- Citizen-candidates, lobbies, and strategic campaigning
- Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters
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