A polyhedral approach to the stability of a family of coalitions

DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2009.10.010MaRDI QIDQ968155zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Néstor E. Aguilera, Mariana S. Escalante

Publication date 5 May 2010

Published in Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2009.10.010

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamepolyhedral theoryfamily of coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3698756 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193411 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3466886 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Generalization of the Perfect Graph Theorem Under the Disjunctive Index
• Anti-blocking polyhedra
• Combinatorial optimization. Packing and covering
• Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games
• Cores of partitioning games
• Fractional kernels in digraphs
• Graph imperfection. I
• Models in cooperative game theory. Crisp, fuzzy, and multi-choice games.
• Normal hypergraphs and the perfect graph conjecture
• On certain polytopes associated with graphs
• On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games
• Perfect graphs are kernel solvable
• Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games
• Recognizing Berge graphs
• Shapley value for multichoice cooperative games. I
• Stable families of coalitions and normal hypergraphs
• Strongly balanced cooperative games
• The egalitarian solution for multichoice games
• The strong perfect graph theorem

Cited in

(4)

• Approximate coalitional equilibria in the bipolar world
• Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability

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