A polyhedral approach to the stability of a family of coalitions

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2009.10.010zbMath1237.91023OpenAlexW2001211668MaRDI QIDQ968155

Mariana S. Escalante, Néstor E. Aguilera

Publication date: 5 May 2010

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2009.10.010

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamepolyhedral theoryfamily of coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games

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