The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games
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- The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games
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- The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
Cites work
- A Catalog of EXISTS-R-Complete Decision Problems About Nash Equilibria in Multi-Player Games.
- A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
- Complexity of some geometric and topological problems
- Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game
- Estimates of real roots of a system of algebraic equations
- ETR-completeness for decision versions of multi-player (symmetric) Nash equilibria
- Exotic quantifiers, complexity classes, and complete problems
- Fixed points, Nash equilibria, and the existential theory of the reals
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 17663 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
- New complexity results about Nash equilibria
- Non-cooperative games
- On equilibria in finite games
- On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points
- Realizability of graphs and linkages
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Sequential Equilibria
- Solving systems of polynomial inequalities in subexponential time
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- The complexity of approximating a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of a multi-player game in strategic form
- The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
- The computational complexity of some problems of linear algebra
- The computational complexity of trembling hand perfection and other equilibrium refinements
- The myth of the folk theorem
- The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games
- Two examples of strategic equilibrium
- Universality of Nash Equilibria
Cited in
(11)- The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
- Computational complexity of multi-player evolutionarily stable strategies
- Computational complexity of computing a quasi-proper equilibrium
- The complexity of approximating a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of a multi-player game in strategic form
- The computational complexity of trembling hand perfection and other equilibrium refinements
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7559416 (Why is no real title available?)
- The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games
- On the computational complexity of decision problems about multi-player Nash equilibria
- Computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in win-lose multi-player games
- Improved hardness results for the clearing problem in financial networks with credit default swaps
- Geometric thickness of multigraphs is \(\exists \mathbb{R}\)-complete
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