Variable temptations and black mark reputations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:485755
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.003zbMath1302.91102MaRDI QIDQ485755
Christina Aperjis, Richard J. Zeckhauser, Yali Miao
Publication date: 14 January 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:5027138
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Variable temptations and black mark reputations
- Sustainable reputations with rating systems
- Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
- Restricted feedback in long term relationships
- Repeated games with one-memory
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- Social norms and random matching games
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
- Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Collusion and Price Rigidity