Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(79)90004-8zbMath0413.90005OpenAlexW2054026524MaRDI QIDQ598980

John A. Ferejohn, Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 1979

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-134446210

zbMATH Keywords

social choicebinary constitutionsbinary decision ruledecisive coalitiongeneralized decisiveness structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (20)

Voting operators in the space of choice functions ⋮ Limits of acyclic voting ⋮ Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions ⋮ Hierarchical voting ⋮ Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions ⋮ The structure of neutral monotonic social functions ⋮ Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules ⋮ A Borda count for partially ordered ballots ⋮ Semisimple games, enactment power and generalized power indices ⋮ Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains ⋮ Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions. ⋮ Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules ⋮ Conditions on social-preference cycles ⋮ Product filters, acyclicity and suzumura consistency ⋮ Consensus functions on tree quasi-orders that satisfy an independence condition ⋮ Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences ⋮ The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union ⋮ Local operators in models of social choice ⋮ The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions ⋮ New problems in the general choice theory

Cites Work

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• Formal Structure of Majority Decision

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