Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
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Publication:662271
DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0276-8zbMath1247.91031MaRDI QIDQ662271
Joseph Y. Halpern, Leandro C. Rêgo
Publication date: 22 February 2012
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0276-8
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