Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002zbMath1278.91024OpenAlexW2004965319MaRDI QIDQ665090

Yuval Heller, Tristan Tomala, Eilon Solan

Publication date: 5 March 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25895/1/MPRA_paper_25895.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cheap-talkdistributed computationcommunication equilibriumnormal-form correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals, Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

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