Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
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Publication:700128
DOI10.1006/game.2001.0894zbMath1030.91009OpenAlexW2068991435MaRDI QIDQ700128
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0894
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