Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.01.007zbMath1236.91041OpenAlexW3121132697MaRDI QIDQ719893

Jan Potters, Marta Serra-Garcia, Eric E. C. van Damme

Publication date: 12 October 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/4b2421f3-f39c-4012-afef-d2c323fee7cd

zbMATH Keywords

communicationefficiencypublic goodslying

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Public goods (91B18) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (7)

Hiding opinions by minimizing disclosed information: an obfuscation-based opinion dynamics model ⋮ Vagueness in multidimensional proposals ⋮ Delegation based on cheap talk ⋮ What goes around, comes around: experimental evidence on exposed lies ⋮ Ambiguous signals, partial beliefs, and propositional content ⋮ Communication-enhancing vagueness ⋮ Reacting to ambiguous messages: an experimental analysis

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Communication, risk, and efficiency in games
• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
• Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest

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