Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.006zbMath1236.91075OpenAlexW2027421555MaRDI QIDQ719876

Daniel Cardona, Clara Ponsatí

Publication date: 12 October 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalitysingle-peaked preferencesquota rulesone-dimensional bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

A bargaining model of endogenous procedures ⋮ Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem ⋮ A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model ⋮ Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model ⋮ THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIR ⋮ Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol ⋮ Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax

Cites Work

• One-dimensional bargaining
• Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
• The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo
• On 64%-Majority Rule
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information

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