Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.010zbMath1394.91124OpenAlexW3124224721MaRDI QIDQ738934

Battal Doğan

Publication date: 16 August 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.010

zbMATH Keywords

no-envydivide-and-transposeNash-implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game ⋮ A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Children crying at birthday parties. Why?
• On the fair division of a heterogeneous commodity
• Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The no envy approach to compensation
• On fair compensation
• Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Two-player envy-free multi-cake division
• Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
• On combining implementable social choice rules
• Divide-and-permute
• Intersection of Nash implementable social choice correspondences
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Fairness and externalities
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

This page was built for publication: Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies