Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0363-3zbMath1190.91008MaRDI QIDQ836921

Brennan C. Platt

Publication date: 9 September 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0363-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A12: Cooperative games

Cites Work

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