A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set

DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0419-zzbMath1202.91070arXiv0711.2961OpenAlexW1533391239MaRDI QIDQ964822

Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein, Felix Fischer, Maximilian L. Mair

Publication date: 21 April 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0711.2961

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (17)

Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox ⋮ The complexity of computing minimal unidirectional covering sets ⋮ Minimal extending sets in tournaments ⋮ Revealed Preference Tests of Collectively Rational Consumption Behavior: Formulations and Algorithms ⋮ The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior ⋮ Minimal stable sets in tournaments ⋮ On the structure of stable tournament solutions ⋮ The minimal covering set in large tournaments ⋮ A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz ⋮ A note on contestation-based tournament solutions ⋮ Minimal retentive sets in tournaments ⋮ Voting Procedures, Complexity of ⋮ Computing the minimal covering set ⋮ Still more on the tournament equilibrium set ⋮ The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets ⋮ \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters ⋮ Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions

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