Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.004zbMath1157.91405OpenAlexW3126004840MaRDI QIDQ1007324

Yuzhe Zhang

Publication date: 20 March 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

persistenceprincipal-agent problemstochastic control problemefficiency lines

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic systems and control (93E99) Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (9)

On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment ⋮ Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring ⋮ Analysis of a Dynamic Adverse Selection Model with Asymptotic Efficiency ⋮ Optimal contract for the principal-agent under Knightian uncertainty ⋮ Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach ⋮ A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory ⋮ Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment ⋮ A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints ⋮ Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance

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