Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(81)90076-4zbMath0473.90007OpenAlexW2137438960MaRDI QIDQ1159118

Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/375.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrianoncooperative gameincomplete informationprudencesophisticationvoting strategyequilibrium voteprudent maximin type behaviorsophisticated behaviourvoting scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (21)

Estimating the winning chances of a solution suggested by the first player under conditions of voting by veto ⋮ Dissolving a partnership securely ⋮ Protective and prudent behaviour in games ⋮ A lemma in open sequential voting by veto ⋮ Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers ⋮ On guarantees, vetoes, and random dictators ⋮ Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory ⋮ A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting ⋮ Properties of open procedure of sequential veto-voting ⋮ Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs ⋮ Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile ⋮ Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion ⋮ Controlling the order of moves in voting by veto. II. Algorithms for constructing an optimal order of moves ⋮ Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem ⋮ Protective behavior in matching models ⋮ Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function ⋮ Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results ⋮ Implementability via protective equilibria ⋮ General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria ⋮ The stability set as a social choice correspondence.

Cites Work

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• Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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