The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(76)90063-6zbMath0351.90002OpenAlexW2030710501MaRDI QIDQ1235632

Peter C. Fishburn, William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90063-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Mathematical economics (91B99) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (28)

The expected likelihood of transitivity: A survey ⋮ An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters ⋮ The expected likelihood of transitivity for probabilistic choosers with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules ⋮ Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems ⋮ Combinatorics of Election Scores ⋮ The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules ⋮ Investigating the probability of a voting cycle when the electorate is large ⋮ Condorcet proportions and Kelly's conjectures ⋮ Counting condorcet ⋮ Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes ⋮ Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules ⋮ The expected likelihood of transitivity for a probabilistic chooser ⋮ Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice ⋮ Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice ⋮ Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach ⋮ Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions ⋮ A recursion relation for the probability of the paradox of voting ⋮ Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates ⋮ Proportions of profiles with a majority candidate ⋮ Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections ⋮ Transitivity revisited ⋮ Social acceptability of Condorcet committees ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser ⋮ Condorcet's paradox ⋮ Fair in the Eyes of Others ⋮ A general concept of majority rule

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives
• The cyclical majority problem
• ON THE MOMENTS OF ORDER STATISTICS IN SAMPLES FROM NORMAL POPULATIONS

This page was built for publication: The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution