Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1268574
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2394zbMath0911.90015MaRDI QIDQ1268574
Publication date: 5 May 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2394
exchange economy; endowment condition; feasible Bayesian implementation; feasible Nash implementation
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Implementation Theory, Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent, A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism, The endowment game when \(n = 2\), Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
Cites Work
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Bayesian Implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms