Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
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Publication:1363539
DOI10.1006/game.1996.0104zbMath0874.90204OpenAlexW2109574857MaRDI QIDQ1363539
Publication date: 10 August 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/2db2a035c4c83f01282217c666ed6e0dd1ae9256
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