Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00128-3zbMath1124.91350OpenAlexW3125245677MaRDI QIDQ1413220

Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date: 16 November 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00128-3

zbMATH Keywords

coreincomplete informationincentive compatibilityInformational size

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (12)

Conditional exact law of large numbers and asymmetric information economies with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Equilibria and incentives in private information economies ⋮ The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete. ⋮ Equilibrium theory under ambiguity ⋮ Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies ⋮ Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies ⋮ Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments ⋮ Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies ⋮ Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete ⋮ Core convergence with asymmetric information ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.

Cites Work

• Implementation in differential information economies
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

This page was built for publication: Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.