Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00096-6zbMath1068.91059MaRDI QIDQ1414616

David Gale, Ahmet U. Alkan

Publication date: 4 December 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00096-6

zbMATH Keywords

lattice; choice function; revealed preference; stable matching; two-sided market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B68: Matching models

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