Fair solutions to the random assignment problem

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.02.006zbMath1418.91262OpenAlexW2325649278WikidataQ130108116 ScholiaQ130108116MaRDI QIDQ1633672

Christian Basteck

Publication date: 20 December 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/286551/5/fairlotteries.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Walrasian equilibriumprobabilistic serialsd-efficiencysd-core from equal divisionsd-envy-freenesssd-equal-division-lower-bound

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment ⋮ Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem

Cites Work

• Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization
• House allocation with fractional endowments
• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
• A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
• Efficient lottery design
• Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
• The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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