Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning

DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0558-2zbMath1415.91060OpenAlexW2552182715WikidataQ59514937 ScholiaQ59514937MaRDI QIDQ1677253

Bauke Visser, Vladimir A. Karamychev

Publication date: 10 November 2017

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0558-2

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkmoney burningpersuasionoptimal equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Goodwill in communication ⋮ Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers

Cites Work

• Veto-based delegation
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Cheap talk and burned money
• The money-burning refinement: with an application to a political signalling game
• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• A note on cheap talk and burned money
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• A Model of Delegated Project Choice
• Optimal Delegation
• MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY

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