An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00183-0zbMath1068.91009OpenAlexW2114021499MaRDI QIDQ1885437

Eric J. Friedman, Mikhael Shor, Barry Sopher, Scott J. Shenker

Publication date: 28 October 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00183-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games ⋮ Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame. ⋮ Learning under limited information. ⋮ An experimental evaluation of the serial cost sharing rule ⋮ Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: experimental evidence ⋮ Learning strategic environments: An experimental study of strategy formation and transfer

Cites Work

• Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
• Learning behavior in an experimental matching pennies game
• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• A stochastic equilibrium model of internet pricing
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• An iterative method of solving a game
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-spectral Methods
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
• Learning in network contexts: experimental results from simulations