Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1934164
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2007.02.033zbMath1255.91039MaRDI QIDQ1934164
Publication date: 28 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184331
Cites Work
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- Reputation and imperfect information
- The chain store paradox
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- The battle of the sexes when the future is important
- Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
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- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
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