Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2574zbMath0940.91007OpenAlexW1976099262MaRDI QIDQ1970228

Murali Agastya

Publication date: 27 July 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2574

zbMATH Keywords

corebargaining gameavailable surplusstochastically stable allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (11)

Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games ⋮ Stochastic stability in assignment problems ⋮ Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games ⋮ Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems ⋮ Trader matching and the selection of market institutions ⋮ Stochastic stability in a double auction ⋮ Stochastic stability on general state spaces

Cites Work

• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games