Coalitional bargaining games: a new concept of value and coalition formation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.01.010zbMath1485.91017OpenAlexW4210439503MaRDI QIDQ2078092

Armando Gomes

Publication date: 25 February 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining theorycoalitional bargainingmultilateral negotiationsvoting gamesstochastic and dynamic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games

Cites Work

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