Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
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Publication:2385120
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0209-9zbMath1180.91101MaRDI QIDQ2385120
Publication date: 11 October 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0209-9
Related Items
Unnamed Item, Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium, On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules, Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
Cites Work
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