Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.03.002zbMath1397.91268OpenAlexW2338611118MaRDI QIDQ2406941

Yasuhiro Shirata, Nozomu Muto

Publication date: 4 October 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

endowmentmultiple goodsauction marketdestruction-proof mechanismper-capita goods-buyer submodularity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods

Cites Work

• Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
• Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
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• Manipulation via capacities revisited
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• Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
• Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
• Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains

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