The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games
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Publication:2415990
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.02.004zbMath1411.91124OpenAlexW2916742939MaRDI QIDQ2415990
Simin He, Theo Offerman, Jeroen van de Ven
Publication date: 23 May 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.02.004
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Cites Work
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