Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2415756
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.10.037zbMath1412.91008OpenAlexW2012461619WikidataQ35468496 ScholiaQ35468496MaRDI QIDQ2415756
Yoh Iwasa, Karl Sigmund, Ulf Dieckmann, Joung Hun Lee
Publication date: 23 May 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11532/1/LeeEtAl2014-corruptionA4.pdf
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (13)
Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Bribery games on interdependent complex networks ⋮ The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service ⋮ Bidirectional supervision: an effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games ⋮ Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources ⋮ Fear induced explosive transitions in the dynamics of corruption ⋮ Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control ⋮ Comparison between best-response dynamics and replicator dynamics in a social-ecological model of lake eutrophication ⋮ The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor ⋮ Mean-field-game model of corruption ⋮ Zero-sum polymatrix games with link uncertainty: a Dempster-Shafer theory solution ⋮ Evolutionary inspection and corruption games ⋮ Waves of infection emerging from coupled social and epidemiological dynamics
Cites Work
- Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
- Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
- Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
- The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
- Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
- The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
- Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
- Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
- Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes
- The Calculus of Selfishness
This page was built for publication: Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
