Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.012zbMath1284.91167OpenAlexW2078874553MaRDI QIDQ2434233

Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed

Publication date: 5 February 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.012

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsinformation aggregationlarge markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Pricing of fluctuations in electricity markets ⋮ A link between sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic games and their large finite counterparts ⋮ Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism ⋮ Stationary anonymous sequential games with undiscounted rewards ⋮ Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection ⋮ College assignment as a large contest ⋮ Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: existence, approximation, and market structure ⋮ Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects ⋮ Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem

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