A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities

From MaRDI portal
Revision as of 22:29, 2 February 2024 by Import240129110113 (talk | contribs) (Created automatically from import240129110113)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)

Publication:2439922

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.005zbMath1292.91027OpenAlexW3123317266MaRDI QIDQ2439922

Łukasz Balbus, Kevin L. Reffett, Łukasz Woźny

Publication date: 26 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.005




Related Items (20)

On the computation of value correspondences for dynamic gamesA strategic dynamic programming method for studying short-memory equilibria of stochastic games with uncountable number of statesDiscontinuous stochastic gamesElementary subpaths in discounted stochastic gamesStationary Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic gamesMarkov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public informationOn the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementaritiesMonotone and bounded interval equilibria in a coordination game with information aggregationMarkov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate riskMarkov perfect equilibria in OLG models with risk sensitive agentsTotal reward semi-Markov mean-field games with complementarity propertiesSuper- and submodularity of stopping games with random observationsStrategic complements in two stage, \(2\times 2\) gamesStochastic games of resource extractionA constructive geometrical approach to the uniqueness of Markov stationary equilibrium in stochastic games of intergenerational altruismOn uniqueness of time-consistent Markov policies for quasi-hyperbolic consumers under uncertaintyTime consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumersDirectional monotone comparative staticsStochastic Comparative Statics in Markov Decision ProcessesEuler-Lagrange equations of stochastic differential games: application to a game of a productive asset



Cites Work


This page was built for publication: A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities