Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.014zbMath1281.91073OpenAlexW2065500237MaRDI QIDQ2435905

Rudolf Müller, Gergely Csapó

Publication date: 21 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/879233/guid-44c5f27c-84f7-4963-8f34-d01afee05ce2-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

public good provisionmechanism designprofit maximization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences

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