On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences

DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0785-8zbMath1296.91111OpenAlexW2168220207MaRDI QIDQ2447167

Ton Storcken, Murat Ozturk, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 24 April 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11779/1007

zbMATH Keywords

single-dipped preferencesPareto optimalitystrategy-proofnesscommittee voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (12)

Fair and square: cake-cutting in two dimensions ⋮ Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem ⋮ Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model ⋮ Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Single-basined choice ⋮ A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules ⋮ An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Approximation randomized strategy-proof mechanisms in obnoxious facility game with weighted agents ⋮ A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications ⋮ Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval ⋮ A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
• Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
• Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
• Taxing pollution: agglomeration and welfare consequences
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
• Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object

This page was built for publication: On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences