Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007zbMath1281.91123MaRDI QIDQ2455677

Lars Ehlers, Jordi Massó

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete information; matching market; singleton core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B68: Matching models

Related Items

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains, An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism, Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems, Optimal truncation in matching markets, Stability with one-sided incomplete information, Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation, Matching markets under (in)complete information, School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms, Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences, Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria, Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems, Incentives in decentralized random matching markets

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